Stakeholders versus shareholders in governance match: “Jensen is Offside!” playing total football by adding social dimension to the win/profit paradigm

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to evaluate whether multi-stakeholder governance compromises efficiency, as suggested by Jensen’s “problem of governance”, by comparing the efficiency of Spanish football member-owned clubs and stakeholder-owned Sport Stock Corporations (SSCs). Design/methodology/approach – Data Envelopment Analysis and Tobit panel data regression are applied to assess the sporting, economic and social efficiency of all football teams competing in the Spanish first division between 2010 / 11 and 2020 / 21. Findings – Clubs outperform SSCs in sporting efficiency, present no significant difference in economic efficiency and achieve slightly higher, albeit statistically non-significant, social efficiency. These findings refute Jensen’s premise, indicating that stakeholder-based governance is not inherently inefficient. Originality/value – The continued existence of football clubs in Spain provides exceptional insight into Jensen’s “problem of governance” and the stakeholder theory. This paper provides novel insights into governance models in professional football, offering empirical evidence that stakeholder-oriented approaches can yield comparable or superior results to shareholder models. It encourages the participation of stakeholders in football governance systems, prevents the existing clubs from being transformed into SSCs and highlights the potential to reintroduce stakeholder participation in governance across football and other industries.